Modi's India took several aggressive Foreign Policy leaps this year, expect 2018 to be like 2017
When the Asean festival is over – 10 heads of state and government will be our chief guests for Republic Day – we may find that 2018 is more of 2017. That may not be a bad thing. Three big developments stood out in India’s foreign policy that will continue their trajectory in 2018. The China challenge was the real McCoy and put hair on India’s chest (sexism alert) this year. India picked up many silent brownie points over how she stood her ground on the Doklam crisis, but a bigger play happened on that account. Doklam was a unique moment – restricting the Chinese in an area where India is militarily at an advantage was important, and, as a nation, we crossed the 1962 hump. More important was how India played the greater game. The much hyped Chinese strategy of san zhong zhanfa (‘Three Warfares’) was exposed. It is PLA’s brainchild for winning a war without fighting through a set of three complementary strategies: media warfare, as in the daily briefings by the Chinese foreign ministry and threats on official media unfortunately picked up by our own brain-deprived TV channels; legal warfare where China brandished real and not-so-real domestic and international law, and threatening military action; psychological warfare, reminding us that 1962 would be upon us again, we would be reduced to dust, etc. By refusing to engage, a remarkable feat for such a vociferous and argumentative nation, official Indian silence robbed China’s campaign of so much oxygen even they didn’t realise it until the very end. However, New Delhi took a bigger foreign policy leap in May when India stood up against OBOR, on the grounds of sovereignty, principles of equity and transparency, calling it out as a colonial enterprise. The effect around the world was much like at a Delhi traffic light – you know you should ignore that red light and bribe the cop if he stops you. Suddenly a guy actually stops at the red light. You think twice. You stop. What does he know that you don’t, you wonder? In the months since India’s terse statement on OBOR dropped on the world like the proverbial 800 pound gorilla, different forums in the EU, US, Japan and Australia have flagged the same uncomfortable questions for the Chinese. Rex Tillerson called it “predatory economics”, EU snobbishly told China its connectivity projects should conform to principles and just voted against China’s application for market economy status. After years of being “exposed” to Chinese influence and money, Australia’s PM Malcolm Turnbull roared “stand up”. India may not have been the reason for everybody to find their spine on China, but New Delhi can certainly claim to be that guy at the traffic light. China won’t forget this in a hurry, and New Delhi should expect that there will be huge temptation to “teach India a lesson” in 2018. That’s when we will know whether India can play a better game, because it will take a lot – and more – out of our South Block mandarins. Second, America may be reeling from the swing from Obama to Trump, but surprisingly, India is probably the only major country that currently has a “normal” relationship with Trump’s America, which leaves you scratching your head – both countries are increasingly upfront about their growing closeness, particularly in the defence, strategic and security domains. India and US are coordinating positions on more global issues than ever, and no, Nikki Haley’s threat to “shame” did not affect India’s decision on the Jerusalem vote (though one suspects it may have cost them a few abstentions). Certainly in south Asia the Trump strategy fits in well with India’s own, even if it puts Pakistan’s nose out of joint. For Trump’s strategy to succeed, India has to take the lead here – in 2018 India needs to maintain the pressure on Pakistan to detox itself from its terror addiction. It’s crucial for the health of this region, particularly Afghanistan, which we cannot afford to lose to jihadis again. China will be compelled to put more good money after bad in Pakistan, which will be oxygen to the army – therefore more important for India to step up opposition to CPEC. Third, look out for more trilaterals and minilaterals in 2018 featuring India as a pillar. The new Indian foreign policy mantra is to move where we can, use stronger bilateral relationships for regional and global goals, or as a strategist explains “exploit the space between bilateral and multilateral”. The “quad” and Malabar is a classic one – India’s initial hesitation unwittingly drew attention to Australia’s China vulnerabilities which Canberra is fixing speedily. The India-Australia relationship is ready for take off, keep your eyes peeled for more action outside cricket. India-Japan-US, India-Australia-Japan, etc to look at the Asian theatre, India-Russia-China to reassure Russia, India-France, India-US, India-Australia and others in the Indian Ocean, BBIN in the south Asian mohalla … the list goes on. On the world stage, India is fighting elections much like Modi in Gujarat – look at the bruising battle for the ICJ, where we stayed more than the British candidate. India put away more sedate successes in ITLOS, UNESCO and IMO. This gluttony will increase, because we are stepping out to own global governance institutions with the appetite of a rising power. This year India played on the front foot with some success. But it means increasingly India’s actions on the world stage have to be thought through beyond visual range. The playing field has changed.
